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The 20th century has witnessed a steady, marked increase in the
average life expectancy of Americans. Advances in nutrition, an increased em-
phasis on preventative health care, and developments in the treatment and miti-
gation of cancer and other fatal illnesses are among the many factors which have
contributed most recently to the ability of Americans to live longer, healthier
lives.
Even with these advances, however, there are an increasing number
of Americans who believe that the marginal benet of surviving a few extra
months is not worth the cost of suering the pain, physical and/or mental
deterioration, or increased dependency they would experience during that period
due to a terminal illness or a debilitating condition. For these people, the right
to opt to die painlessly, simply, and with dignity at the time and place of their
choosing is paramount, and in recent years they have taken steps to secure that
right. Their convictions have given rise to the Hemlock Society,1 the passage of
an Oregon referendum authorizing physician-assisted suicide,2 and the work of
Dr. Jack Kevorkian, who has personally assisted in the suicide of 20 people as of
December 19933 using two patient-activated devices he created himself. Society
1The Hemlock Society was founded in 1980 to secure the right of a terminally ill person to
choose voluntary euthanasia. As of 1990, it had 38,000 members and 70 chapters. DEREK
HUMPHRY, FINAL EXIT 180 (1991).
2Measure 16 permits a physician to assist a terminally ill patient (dened as a person
who has less than six months to live due to a terminal illness) in committing suicide if several
conditions are met, including: three separate requests for life-ending medication by the patient
(two oral and one in writing); a 15 day waiting period between the rst request and the writing
of the prescription; and concurrence of the diagnosis of the patient's terminal condition by a
second physician. Under the Initiative, The Process of, OREGoNIAN, Oct. 7, 1994, at El.
3State High Court to Hear Kevorkian Suicide-Law Appeal, WASHINGTON POST, June7,
1has rarely strongly opposed the exercise of thisright; indeed, while 28 states
currently have laws declaring assistance in suicide a crime,4 no physician has
been convicted for aiding in a suicide,5 and conviction of other types of suicide
assistants has been sporadic at best. On the other hand, Michigan did ultimately
prohibit physician-assisted suicide (PAS) in order to legally stop Dr. Kevorkian,
and an injunction has prohibited enforcement of Oregon's referendum pending
the resolution of constitutional challenges.6
If the passage of Measure 16 and the popular support shown for
Dr. Kevorkian are any indication, however, it appears likely that over the next
few years, the law will increasingly accept, or at least continue to turn a blind
eye toward, the use of drugs and medical devices in PAS. This development
would create a uniquely dicult position for the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), as it is committed to protecting public health by ensuring that marketed
drugs and medical devices are safe and eective for their intended use. How
could one declare a product intended to cause death safe, and how could one
1994, at A7 [hereinafter WASHINGTON POST].
4The table provided in JOAN BROVINS AND ThOMAS OEHMKE, DR. DEATH: DR.
JACK KEVORKIAN'S PRESCRIPTION: DEATh, 245 (1993) lists 25 states (including Michi-
gan and Oregon) as having legislation in place making assisting a suicide a crime, along with
10 states in which such legislation was pending at the time of publication. Since then, four
states (Indiana, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin) have passed such legislation. See 35 INi.
CODE ANN. x42-1-2.5 (West 1994); 34 TENN. CODE ANN. x13-216 (1994);5 TEx. CODE
ANN. x22.08 (West 1994); Wis. STAT ANN. x940.12 (West 1994). In addition, since publi-
cation Oregon passed Measure 16, eectively removing it from the abovementioned list of 25.
Therefore, the current total number of states with legislation criminalizing assisting a suicide
is 28.
5H. TRISTAM ENGLEHARDT, JR. AND MICHELE MALLOY, Suicide and As-
sisting Suicide: A Critique of Legal Sanctions, 36 Sw. L.J. 1003, 1029 n. 126. Dr. Kevorkian
was charged with murder for assisting in two suicides, but the Michigan courts dismissed the
cases in the absence of a clear state statute declaring that assisting a suicide is a crime. The
Michigan Court of Appeals has reinstated the charges, though Oakland County Prosecutor
Richard Thompson has said he will proceed with prosecution until the Michigan Supreme
Court rules on the constitutionality of the suicide assistance ban passed in 1993. WASHING-
TON POST, supra note 3, at A7.
6Lee v. Oregon, 1994 WL 728858 (D.Or. 1994).
2ensure that it is eective without involving the tester in a mass suicide/murder?
On the other hand, shouldn't the FDA ensure that such products meet their
intended purpose in order to minimize the risk of a product's failure causing an
undesired agonizing death or a patient being left in a vegetative state? Assuming
that the agency could logically nd a way to apply its safety and eectiveness
requirements to this area, should the agency devote its limited resources to
regulating items whose purpose is promoting death rather than life? These
issues will be the focus of this paper. Section I will consider whether and how
the existing Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act) and FDA regulations
could be applied in this area. The initial focus will be on the paradigm suicide
machines, namely those developed by Dr. Kevorkian, which will serve as the
starting point for a discussion of how the FDA could regulate not only drug-
based machines, but pharmaceuticals as well. Section II will then address the
policy considerations involved in regulating drugs and devices use in PAS: is it
just an issue of ecient allocation of FDA resources, or is there more at stake?
Finally, Section III will conclude with a prediction of where FDA is likely to
come out on this issue, along with some recommendations on how FDA should
proceed in this developing area of food and drug law.
I
The creation and/or distribution of any product designed to assist
in suicide would certainly fall under FDA purview, if only because the item
would be intended to aect the structure or any function of the body of man.7
7Id.
3Before considering whether and how the FDA could regulate such an item,
however, an understanding of the form any such product might take must be
obtained. For this purpose, subsection A will describe the paradigm suicide
products, Dr. Kevorkian's two machines. 8 Based on this example, subsection
B will then analyze how existing FDA regulations and policies could be applied
to such products. Subsection C will then give the same treatment to those drugs
which may be used with or without a device in PAS.
A.The Suicide Machines
The goal of those seeking to end their lives before a terminal illness
or debilitating disease produces conditions which are unbearable goes beyond
the simple desire to control the time and place of death. Rather, one of the
primary motivating factors for these individuals is death with dignity, a desire
that the manner and appearance of the individual at the time of death not
mar the otherwise pleasant memories of the individual in the minds of those
who remain. For these people, this militates against the use of guns, knives,
or other violent means of taking one's life; violation of the physical appearance
of the corpse would detract from the decedent's dignity. Pharmaceuticals often
provide the best of both worlds { a quick, theoretically painless death without
desecration of the decedent's body {but self-medication with a lethal dose of a
toxic substance is not possible for all patients who wish to end their lives. For
while information on lethal dosages for the average person is readily available9
8Although the second contraption Dr. Kevorkian used to induce death did not use any
gears or motors or otherwise resemble what might ordinarily be considered a machine, this
term will be used in this paper to refer collectively to Dr. Kevorkian's products as a matter
of convenience.
9Derek Humphry provides a chart listing some drugs and their lethal dosages in his book,
4and many physicians are willing to prescribe such dosages despite the state
of the law,10 patients may be unwilling to administer the drug on themselves
because they are concerned about taking a sublethal dose or about regurgitating
some of the medication. In addition, they may be unable to self-medicate either
because they are unable to swallow the pills or because they lack to motor skills
necessary to take the medication themselves. A drug-based suicide machine,
however, provides the requisite solution for everyone involved. The physician
could hook the machine up to the patient and then leave its activation up to the
patient. The patient could thereby control the time of death and achieve the
benets of a drug-induced death, while the physician could justify her action
by saying that while she provided the means, she did not cause the death. It
was on the basis of such logic that Dr. Kevorkian sought to develop his suicide
machines.
On April 26, 1990, Dr. Kevorkian appeared on The Donahue Show
advertising and discussing his latest invention, the Mercitron.11 Already the
subject of a number of local and national newspaper articles,12 the Mercitron
was designed to be a vast improvement over the noose, shotgun, and even bar-
biturates; it would allow a patient to choose the time and place of death and
Final Exit. See HUMPHRY, supra, note 1, at 117-123. There are also a database on Westlaw,
Registry of Toxic Eects of Chemical Substances (RTECS) listing drugs that have toxic eects
on human beings.
10One in ve internists indicated in a 1992 informal poll that they have helped cause the
death of a patient. Nancy Gibbs, R.x for Death: Assisted Suicide Physician Jack Kevorkian,
TIME, May 31, 1993, at 34, 37.
11The Donahue Show: Organ Donors on Death Row (NBC television broadcast, Apr. 26,
1990).
12Stories on Dr. Kevorkian and the Mercitron rst appeared in Pontiac, Michigan's Oak-
land Press. The story was later picked up by Detroit News and subsequently was spread
over the regular wire services. JACK KEVORKIAN, PRESCRiPTION: MEDICIDE: THE
GOODNESS OF PLANNED DEATH 215 (1991).
5would ensure a non-violent, painless demise. The machine consisted of three
bottles suspended from an aluminum frame and connected to a single intra-
venous line; a timer; and the motor from a toy car.13 Once the intravenous
needle was inserted in the patient's arm, the rst bottle would provide a harm-
less saline drip; the bottle of saline solution could be drained into the patient
and replaced repeatedly for as long as the patient chose to remain alive. When
the patient was ready, she would push a large red button, starting the timer
and switching the IV line to the second bottle, which contained thiopental (pen-
tothal). The thiopental would induce sleep within approximately 30 seconds.
About one minute later,14 the machine would cut o the thiopental and switch
the IV line to the third bottle, which contained a mixture of potassium chloride
and succinylcholine (a muscle relaxant).15 Upon reaching the heart, the muscle
relaxant would stop the organ from beating, causing a painless heart attack and
inducing death within minutes. Dr. Kevorkian built the machine himself using
parts he found at ea markets; the total cost was approximately $30.16
He tested the machine by running it and draining the solutions
into a small bottle. It was never tested on an animal or human being before Dr.
Kevorkian gave it to his rst suicide patient, Janet Adkins, on June 4, 199017
131d. at 208-9; HUMPHRY, supra note 1, at 135.
14The sources describing the operation of the Mercitron were not clear whether this was
one minute after the patient pressed the button or one minute after the 30 seconds allowed
for the thiopental to take eect.
15HUMPHRY, supra note 1, at 134-5. According to Dr. Kevorkian, this is the same
solution administered to prisoners sentenced to death by lethal injection. Susan Jezewski,
Can a Suicide Machine Trigger the Murder Statute, Note, 37 WAYNE L. REv. 1921, 1923
n.5.
16KEVORKIAN, supra note 13, at 209.
171d. at 227-30. Dr. Kevorkian did try to obtain a dog scheduled to be put to sleep in order
to test the Mercitron. When he encountered signicant bureaucratic problems, however, he
decided not to test the machine and reverted to his personal philosophy, namely never do on
any live animal anything aimed solely or primarily for human benet, and for the performance
6The Mercitron successfully assisted Mrs. Adkins in committing suicide that day,
and eight months after Dr. Kevorkian was prohibited by Judge Alice Gilbert
from using it on another patient, it also assisted in the suicide of Marjorie
Wantz.18 These have been the only two patients to use the Mercitron, which
now sits in Dr. Kevorkian's attorney's oce.
On the same day Mrs. Wantz used the Mercitron, Dr. Kevorkian
was able to try out a new suicide contraption on another patient. This machine
involved no gears or timers, but rather just a Kevorkian-designed mask attached
by a tube to a canister of carbon monoxide. 19At the same time Mrs. Wantz
activated the Mercitron, Sherry Miller put the mask over her face, pulled the
clip o of the hose and inhaled the carbon monoxide until it caused unconscious-
ness and, 18 minutes later, death. Dr. Kevorkian has since used this simpler
contraption20on 17 other suicide patients, the last being in December 1993.
B.Could the FDA Regulate a Medical Device Used in PAS?
An initial concern for any regulatory agency is whether it has juris-
diction over the item or person at issue; without jurisdiction, the agency cannot
take any legal action, no matter how heinous an activity may be. As a federal
agency intended to implement the FD&C Act, FDA's jurisdiction is predicated
on the authority of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. Courts' inter-
pretation of this term have been broad, to say the least, with authority being
of which live subjects are available under ethically unassailable circumstances. Id. at 209-11.
18BROVINS AND OEHMKE, supra note 4, at 69-71. Mrs. Wantz died on October 23,
1991.
191d. at 71.
20Unlike the rst machine, the contraption was never given a formal name. For the purpose
of this paper, it will be referred to as the CO mask.
7granted to the FDA to regulate a drug which is only sold intrastate but whose
components were involved in interstate commerce.21 FDA was empowered with
an even broader authority to regulate medical devices. Under 21 U.S.C. x334(a),
the FDA can proceed against adulterated or misbranded devices regardless of
whether they or any of their component parts were involved in interstate com-
merce.22 Thus, the FDA can assert jurisdiction over any medical device, while
it must show that at least a component part of a given drug was involved in
interstate commerce in order to take any legal action regarding that drug.
The dierent scope of FDA authority over drugs and medical de-
vices, though functionally minimal, raises the issue of how to categorize suicide
machines which are based on delivery of a lethal drug into the human body. This
determination is actually a rather important one, since it would not only aect
the extent of FDA jurisdiction, but would also aect whether any pre-market
approval process might be necessary for the item and what considerations would
be involved in such a process.
Under the denition of medical device in x201(h) of the FD&C Act,
such products could be deemed either drugs or medical devices. According to
the statute, a product is a drug if the primary intended purpose of the item is
achieved through chemical action within or on the body of the patient.23 Thus,
if the primary purpose of the suicide machine is considered to be causation of
215ee, e.g., U.S. v. Dianovin Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 475 F.2d 100, 102-103 (1st Cir. 1973)
(citing U.S. v. Cassaro, Inc., 443 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1971)).
22U.S. v. Undetermined Quantities of an Article of Device labeled in part Depilatron
Epilator, 473 F.Supp. 913. Indeed, x709 of the FD&C Act states that the connection with
interstate commerce in any action taken to enforce the medical device regulations shall be
presumed to exist. 21 U.S.C. x379(a).
2321 U.S.C. x321(h).
8death through the chemical reaction of the drug delivered, the whole contraption
is technically a drug. On the other hand, if these machines are viewed as simple
delivery systems, no dierent from a regular intravenous line, they would be
regulated as a medical device. In short, the statute itself provides little guidance
in this matter.
The key to deciding this issue, ironically, is the manner in which
the item is ultimately distributed. According to the 1991 agreement reached by
the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) and Center for Devices
and Radiological Health (CDRH) regarding jurisdiction over combination prod-
ucts, if an item is distributed unlled and without any drug in the package, it
is generally regulated as a medical device by the CDRH.24 If it is distributed
unlled but with the drug in the same package and with labeling directing use of
the contraption with that drug, it is considered a true combination product over
which the CDRH has ultimately authority but to which the CDER can apply
the drug regulations as necessary.25 Finally, if the product is distributed lled
with the drug, then it is considered a combination product subject to CDER
regulation, with both the drug and device regulations applied as necessary.26 Of
course, FDA's intercenter jurisdiction committee is free to make ad hoc jurisdic-
tional decisions regarding particular items.27 However, based just on the terms
of the agreement, regulation of drug-based suicide machines would depend on
24THE CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH AND THE CENTER
FOR DEVICES AND RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRA-





9the form in which they are distributed.
At rst blush, it might seem most logical for any suicide machine
manufacturer to avoid the constraints of the drug regulations by packaging the
contraption unlled and unaccompanied by the requisite drug. Under x505 of
the FD&C Act, it is illegal to introduce a drug into interstate commerce with
the intent that it be used for a purpose not approved by the FDA. And since
FDA has never approved a drug for use in suicide or euthanasia for man or
animals,28 any manufacturer commercializing a drug for that purpose would
have to go through the full new drug approval (NDA) procedure before putting
the product on the market.
On the other hand, if the manufacturer could show that the unlled,
unaccompanied apparatus is substantially equivalent to a medical device on the
market before 1976, then it could be marketed 90 days after ling a pre-market
notication (PMN) with the FDA. To establish substantial equivalence, the
manufacturer would have to show either 1) that the products have the same
intended use and technological characteristics, or 2) that they have the same
intended use and that the new product is as safe and eective as the marketed
device. This, of course, would require that the manufacturer represent the
product as a pure drug delivery system, ignoring any potential use in assisting
suicide, since this would be the only way to meet the intended use requirement
for PMN status.
Even if the manufacturer could justify the suicide machine as sub-
28U.S. v. Articles of Drug... Labeled in Part... Beuthanasia, FOOD, DRUG, & COSM. L.
REp, @38,265 (1979).
10stantially equivalent to a pre-1976 drug delivery system in its PMN, it would
still not be able to provide any instructional labeling for the use of the device
in assisting suicide. First, FDA considers it a violation of the FD&C Act to
market a device with instructions directing an unapproved use of an FDA ap-
proved drug.29 Therefore, the label could not name any individual drug for
use in the unapproved purpose of causing death. Second, under x502(j) of the
FD&C Act, a device is deemed misbranded if it is dangerous to health when
used in the dosage or manner... prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the
labeling thereof. Indeed, x518(e) requires the FDA to order the cessation of dis-
tribution of any device it nds would cause serious, adverse health consequences
or death. 30 Therefore, if the FDA concluded that suicide was dangerous to
health (an admittedly logical conclusion), it could bring an action against any
manufacturer or other party involved with the distribution of a suicide machine
whose label suggest a fatal use.
Clearly, then, FDA has the authority to regulate, and even pro-
hibit, the manufacture and distribution of most any suicide machine. Even the
provision regarding custom devices in x520(b) provides little solace. They only
exempt such items from the performance standards and pre-marketing approval
requirements of xx5 14 and 515; no exemption is provided regarding x502. Fur-
ther, this subsection only applies to devices which are not generally marketed
and which are intended for use by a specic patient or to meet the special needs
of... [a] physician... in the course of professional practice; 31 it is doubtful that
29FDA Regulatory Letter No. 89-HFD3I3-26, Apr. 28, 1989, at 3.
3021 U.S.C. x360h(e).
31Id.
11even Dr. Kevorkian could justify his Mercitron under such a standard. Likewise,
the exemptions in x520(m) of the FD&C Act would probably not be applied to
this class of products, since they would aect more than 4,000 Americans.
The only real exception to potential FDA control over this would
be if a device like the CO mask were distributed as a regular drug delivery
device without any suicide-related labeling but which relied on word-of-mouth
instructions on how to use it for PAS. Such an item might avoid the constraints
of x520(j) and x520(m) and would probably satisfy the PMN substantial equiv-
alence standard. Indeed, so long as the manufacturer made no claims and
provided no instructions regarding its use in PAS, such products would be the
functional equivalent of barbiturates and other toxic drugs, which are currently
market for other approved purposes but which are used in PAS based on non-
label knowledge about the product.
The FDA could, of course, ignore or creatively interpret x502(j)
and x518(e) so as to permit a device specically intended to be used in PAS to
be marketed.32 Such a device would most certainly be deemed Class III in the
absence of information regarding the suciency of general or specic controls in
assuring its safety and eectiveness and because it could pose an unreasonable
risk of illness or injury.33 As such, the device would have to undergo the full pre-
market approval process for devices, as laid out in FD&C Act x5 15.34 Testing
of the device itself would probably be limited to a demonstration of safety
32Admittedly, this would be a strain of FDA discretion under Chaney, see infra page ?, but
it is an option theoretically available to the FDA.
335ee 21 U.S.C. x360c(a)(1)(C)(i), (ii).
3421 U.S.C. x360e.
12and eectiveness in delivering the drug; the safety and ecacy of the drug in
inducing death would be covered under its approval process for this intended
use.35 Further, the manufacturer would be subject to the preproduction design
validation requirements of x520(0; this basically would mean that even before
approval for marketing the product is obtained, the facilities in which it is
developed and packaged must meet FDA standards. Were the device to meet
the standards set by the FDA and be allowed on the market, it would be subject
to the same constraints as any other medical device.
Among the constraints such a device might face is the authority
of the FDA to restrict the sale of the product,36 much the way the FDA can
require drugs to be distributed only on a prescription basis. As a practical
matter, the FDA currently does not strictly regulate the prescription of drugs
for unapproved uses,37 so the agency probably would take a similar approach
with regard to restricted devices. Some have suggested, however, that the FDA
has the authority to limit the use of prescription/restricted products to their
approved uses.38 Were the FDA to opt to use this authority, it could not only
limit the introduction of a new PAS device, but also prohibit the use of currently
marketed devices in PAS.
B.Could the FDA Regulate a Drug Used in PAS?
The course of potential FDA regulation of drugs intended for use in
35MEDICAL DEVICE REPORTER, supra note 25, at 801. See subsection C, infra p. ?,
for a discussion of FDA approval of drugs for use in PAS.
3621 U.S.C. 360j(r).
375ee discussion infra, p. 15.
385ee, e.g., David A. Kessler, Regulating the Prescribing of Human Drugs for Nonapproved
Uses Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 15 HARV. J. LEGIS. 693.
13PAS would closely mirror that of medical devices designed for the same purpose.
Section 502(j) presents the same nearly insurmountable hurdle for FDA approval
of a new PAS use for pharmaceuticals. Were the FDA to sidestep this obstacle
and consider approving a drug for PAS, that product would also have to undergo
a lengthy approval process, as outlined in x505 of the FD&C Act.39 At the heart
of this process, as in any FDA approval process, is an agency determination that
the product is safe and eective for its intended use. Eectiveness would be a
fairly easy standard to meet: the manufacturer would have to show that there
is substantial evidence that the drug will produce the results claimed for it.40
Meeting the safety requirements might be more dicult, however. Though no
denition of the term safe has been spelled out in the statute or regulations,
toxicity is one factor the FDA has considered in declaring a product unsafe.41 If
the FDA employed a broader denition of the term, such a positive benet/risk
analysis or a nding that the product does not produce any severe side eects
in the course of its use, it might be able to justify approving a drug for a lethal
use. Again, this would be a stretch of FDA discretion, but if the FDA were
set on allowing such products on the market so that they could be carefully
regulated, the agency might be able to justify its actions.
The FDA could also take the extreme opposite approach, denying
approval for any new PAS use and cracking down on unauthorized use of cur-
rently marketed pharmaceuticals in PAS. This move may necessitate a reversal
3921 U.S.C. x355.
40U.S. v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 555 (citing Weinberger v. Hynson, Westrott & Dunning,
Inc., 412 U.S. 608, 629-34).
415. REp. No. 946, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
14of a long-standing policy of recognizing physicians' autonomy and permitting
them to prescribe approved drugs for unapproved uses in the course of medical
practice. 42 At minimum, it would require the FDA to limit its interpretation of
medical practice so as to exclude treatments intended to cause the death of the
patient. Were it to take this tack, the FDA could seize improperly prescribed
drugs and bring criminal actions against physicians, their patients, and possibly
even manufacturers for distributing and/or receiving a drug with the intent that
it be used for an unapproved purpose.
II
The fact the FDA has the authority to regulate a given item does
not mean that the ency is required to do so. On the contrary, FDA regulation
is largely discretionary; given a limited amount of resources to achieve its broad
general mandate of trying to protect the public welfare by determining whether
food, drugs, cosmetics and medical devices are safe and eective, FDA would
defacto have to autonomously determine whether action was necessary and de-
sirable in a given situation. Indeed, the courts have recognized this fact, holding
in Heckler v. Chaney43 that the FDA may decline to bring an action against
or investigate a particular use of a marketed product. However, in that case
the court also warned that where the agency has 'conspicuously and expressly
42in 1972, the FDA issued a proposed rule which would have codied this principle. Legal
Status of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs; Prescribing for Uses Unapp roved by the
Food and Drug Administration.~ Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 37 Fed. Reg. 16503, Aug.
15, 1972. This rule was never nalized, though it has been treated as agency policy ever since.
See, e.g., Use of Approved Drugs for Unlabeled Indications, 12 FDA DRUG BULL. 4 (1982).
The FDA recently declined to withdraw this proposed rule, deciding instead to continue to
review the appropriateness of its enactment. Withdrawal of Certain Pre-1986 Proposed Rules:
Final Action, 56 Fed. Reg. 67440, Dec. 30, 1991.
43470 U.S. 821 (1985).
15adopted a general policy' that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of
its statutory responsibilities... the statute conferring authority on the agency
might indicate that such decisions were not 'committed to agency discretion.'44
Within the realm of this discretion, the FDA may have to decide whether and
to what extent it wishes to regulate drugs and/or medical devices used for PAS,
a decision which would involve the weighing of the countervailing interests of
the agency and other interested parties. Therefore, before one can determine
how the FDA would and should handle this situation, it is necessary to take a
reading of the views of the parties aected by any decision the agency makes in
this regard.
PAS Consumers
From the prospective patient's standpoint, regulation of drugs and
medical devices could be both a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, the
patient using such a PAS product is entitled to the same protection as a per-
son taking an aspirin, namely the guarantee that, within reasonable limits, the
product will safely and eectively do its job. Indeed, the prospective suicide
patient could be considered an even stronger candidate for FDA protection; the
product being used is known to have harmful consequences, and its potential
failure might leave the patient in an even more painful and/or debilitating state
than before. Without instructions on weight/dosage ratios on a product induc-
ing death through barbiturate poisoning, for example, a patient may receive a
sublethal dose and be left in a persistent vegetative state.45 Likewise, if the
44470 U.S. at 832, fn. 4.
45See, Patrick O'Neill, Now the Big Question: How Best to Kill? OREGONIAN, Nov. 28,
16patient has built up a tolerance to a particular lethal drug due to other med-
ications the patient has taken, failure to provide this contraindication on the
labeling may result in a devastating underdose even when the weight/dose ratio
is properly followed.46 Finally, if a product like the Mercitron were improperly
designed or manufactured, the patient may not be unconscious before the oth-
erwise painful heart attack is induced, resulting in a far more painful, agonizing
death than the patient bargained for.
These concerns, however, are counterbalanced by a fear that the
FDA will overregulate this market and deny access to drugs and/or medical
devices for use in PAS altogether. As noted below,47 the logistics of determining
what products are safe and eective for suicide are daunting, and they may
force the FDA to prohibit the use of all drugs and devices for this purpose.
Such a move would functionally trump state laws like Oregon's Measure 16 and
would ultimately deny the right to death with dignity for patients with terminal
illnesses and debilitating diseases. Therefore, unless there was a guarantee that
the FDA would not overregulate drugs and devices which might be used in PAS,
consumers would most likely rather see a maintenance of the status quo, where
the medical profession and groups like the Hemlock Society can unocially
police and prescribe the safe and eective use of these items in PAS.
Opponents to Physician-Assisted Suicide
From the standpoint of those opposing the practice of PAS, FDA




17appreciated, but expected. Their reasoning would be simple. At base, the
FDA's mission is to protect the health and welfare of the American public.
Products used to take a person's life violate that agency goal. Therefore, where
the agency has jurisdiction over the product, it would be incumbent on the FDA
to prohibit suicide machines and drugs from entering the market and to prevent
currently market drugs and devices from being employed to take one's own life.
The Medical Profession
Like their patients, physicians would have conicting concerns on
this issue. For those physicians who are concerned about their terminally ill
or debilitated patients and wish to help them achieve the dignied death their
patients desire, the approach to the issue would mirror the analysis of the con-
sumer's perspective, discussed above.48 Indeed, many doctors may be willing to
rely on their own expertise and decry the need for FDA-regulated instructions
on use of the device or on how much of a given drug will produce a lethal eect.
On the other hand, fear of a malpractice suit in the case of a prescription of
a sublethal dose might drive physicians to call for package inserts and PDR
listings regarding accurate weight/dose ratios and contraindications for use of a
given product in PAS. The motivation behind such a call, of course, would be
that if sued, the doctor could claim that she relied on the package insert and
could attempt to shift liability to the manufacturer.
The deciding factor on the approach of physicians on this issue may,
ironically, be based not on a concern for the patient or the individual doctor, but
48Supra, p. 16.
18for the medical profession as a whole. As indicated above,49 FDA has followed
a policy of not regulating prescription of medications for unapproved uses and
other elements of medical practice. The act of PAS, at heart, could be consid-
ered medical practice; it involves the provision of a drug or medical device by a
physician to her patient for the mitigation of pain or of a disease. Accordingly,
physicians might regard any limitation on PAS as a breach of the FDA's gen-
eral policy and might oppose such limitations in order to prevent a precedent
establishing FDA's right to encroach on the actual practice of medicine. Thus,
doctors would probably oppose any regulation of the use of currently marketed
drugs, medical devices and custom devices in PAS. Because they lack the same
interest in devices not already on the market, however, physicians may not be
as opposed to the regulation of new drugs and/or medical devices intended
specically for use in PAS.
The Business World
Since there currently is no industry producing and/or distributing
drugs or medical devices for use in PAS (unless you count Dr. Kevorkian as a
one-man industry), any decision regarding FDA regulation in this area would
pre-date the eorts of any businesses. Therefore, should FDA prohibit all new
PAS drugs and medical devices altogether, there most likely would be no in-
dustry outcry or complaint. Likewise, there would be little basis for industry
complaint should the FDA choose a dierent level of regulation, since the busi-
nesses would be assuming the burdens of those regulations when they enter this
49Supra, p. 15 and accompanying note.
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Industry opposition might arise, however, if the FDA went beyond
prohibiting new drugs and medical devices and began regulating the use of
currently-marketed drugs and/or devices. Though unlikely in most cases, should
the FDA conclude that the risk associated with a particular product due to its
use in PAS outweighs the benets generated by its other uses, FDA could with-
draw approval of the product and/or ban it from the market. Such a move could
bankrupt a small pharmaceutical company and seriously cripple a larger one.
Therefore, the pharmaceutical and medical device industries would probably
ght to draw the line of FDA regulation at new drugs and devices specically
intended for use in PAS, though they would probably not oppose any action the
FDA took regarding those products.
The Food and Drug Administration
Counterbalanced against the potential pressures from other groups
to act or not to act lie the internal operational concerns of the FDA. At the
top of the list, at least in 1995, would be the adequacy of resources to enforce
any regulatory decision the agency chose to make. Faced with a possible ve
percent budget cut in the coming year, FDA may have enough trouble handling
the programs and products currently in its regulatory purview without adding
a whole new class of products or a new, stricter policy regarding the use of
currently marketed products. In short, the FDA may not have the manpower
or money to take any armative stand on this issue.
Further, were the FDA to permit PAS drugs and devices onto the
20market, the agency would face the thorny problem of authorizing clinical studies
to test the safety and eectiveness of the products. Manufacturers might be
able to justify the safety of their products based on tests using a reasonable
clinical surrogate endpoints short of death or on the results of prior studies of
the active ingredients. However, a large number of patient deaths might still
be required to establish accurate weight/dose ratios, information necessary to
ensure the eective use of the product. Eorts to extrapolate such information
from animal trials would draw the ire of animal rights activists, who would
decry the slaughter of the lab animals in the clinical studies, and would increase
the risk of erroneous lethal dosage tables. Without sucient testing, however,
the FDA would have no basis for authorizing the marketing of the product.50
Thus, the FDA would be faced with weighing the testing options against the
social benet of authorizing the use of drugs and/or devices in PAS. More than
likely, this balance would tip against granting products intended for PAS use
even investigational drug or device status, much less market approval.
On the other hand, the FDA might shy away from strongly regu-
lating the use of currently marketed drugs and devices in PAS, so long as their
manufacturers do not blatantly violate federal law by recommending such a use
for their products. Many of the drugs and devices which might be subject to
FDA action due to their unapproved use in PAS, including an anesthetist mask,
an IV needle, and thiopental, have signicant uses unrelated to suicide, and
medicine would suer tremendously if manufacturers of these products quit the
505ee, Lake v. FDA, Medical Devices Reporter (CCH) @15,117, p. 771 (It could not have
been in the intent of Congress to allow the marketing of unproven medical devices about which
no scientic evidence is available).
21market due to overregulation. Further, as indicated above,51 the FDA might
face the wrath of the medical profession if the agency were to attempt to limit
the prescription and use of already approved products.
III
So where will the FDA go from here? Peering into the crystal ball
and predicting the future is a precarious art at best, but the foregoing analysis
provides some basis for extrapolating the FDA's role in this potential regulatory
eld and for making some suggestions as to how the FDA might play such a
role successfully.
First, it is doubtful that FDA will make any exceptions under the
law to permit new PAS drugs and devices onto the market. To do so would
require not only a tortured reading of x502(j) 518(e), but also a huge commit-
ment of FDA's already strained resources in reinterpreting statutory language
and developing new testing and/or approval procedures to accommodate the
morbid intended purpose of such products.
On the other hand, FDA will probably continue to turn a blind
eye to the use of currently market drugs and devices in PAS. Prohibiting such
use would pit the FDA against manufacturers, physicians, the public at large
and/or PAS supporters, with no chance for a real winner to emerge from the
fray. If the FDA prosecutes the original source of the products, claiming that
they were market with an intended use in PAS, manufacturers might be discour-
aged from producing such items. The drying up of markets in these otherwise
51Supra, p. 19.
22essential products would drastically increase health care costs and would deprive
patients of needed drugs and medical devices. If the FDA prosecuted physicians
for prescribing and/or dispensing drugs and/or devices for unapproved use in
PAS, the agency might succeed in ending not only unapproved use in PAS, but
also all unauthorized, experimental treatment regimens using products for un-
approved uses. The impact such an event would have on the advance of medical
technology would be vast, since experimentation by individual physicians has
been one of the leading sources of new methods of treating disease. Further, any
limitation on physician prescriptions would lead the AMA to bring its political
and social weight to bear on the FDA, a position no agency would willingly
assume. Of course, any of the aforementioned eects would drastically impact
the general public, causing the FDA to draw its ire, with potentially serious
political consequences for the agency. In addition, an eort to change the sta-
tus quo would meet with an immediate reaction from the Hemlock Society and
the increasing number of Americans who share its ideology, who are trying at
the state level to push the law in the opposite direction. As an agency whose
programs depend in large part in popular belief in and respect for it, the FDA
would suer badly from a negative media campaign instituted by those favoring
PAS. In light of these potential costly conicts with dierent sectors of society,
the FDA would do well not to tamper with the existing policy of not regulating
the use of currently-marketed drugs and medical devices in PAS.
This overall policy of virtual non-action does not mean that the
FDA should ignore this problem. Should the Oregon law pass constitutional
23muster, the Oregon Medical Association (OMA) is likely to go ahead and rec-
ommend specic drugs and dosages for their use in PAS.52 To ignore this report
would be to violate one of the agency's principles:
Where the unapproved use of an approved new drug becomes widespread
or endangers the public health, the Food and Drug Administration is obligated
to investigate it thoroughly and to take whatever action is warranted to protect
the public. 53 However, to require NDA's for all of the recommended drugs
would be to open the whole can of regulatory worms mentioned above. This
potential disaster could and should be headed o by the FDA, by recommending
either 1) that the OMA not issue its report at all, or 2) that the report refer
physicians to already existing reliable treatises and databases on pharmacologi-
cal toxicology without recommending any drugs for PAS by name.54 This way,
the OMA can achieve its goal of informing its membership, and the FDA can
avoid the direct challenge of a state medical association recommending a drug
for an unapproved use which is not regulable from the agency's perspective.
The FDA would also be well-served by taking a hard public stance
regarding Dr. Kevorkian's agrant disregard for FDA regulations on every-
thing from good manufacturing practices to distribution of untested, unap-
proved drugs and/or devices. As a practical matter, it may be a little late
now for the FDA to rst begin bringing charges against Dr. Kevorkian; his last
assisted suicide was in December 1993. Further, it is questionable whether FDA
520'Neill, supra note 46, at A8.
5337 FR 16503, 16504.
54Such a report would not violate the FD&C Act, since a doctor may legally advocate to
other doctors an unapproved use of a drug so long as she does not distribute that drug to
other doctors and is not holding the drug for sale. U.S. v. Evers, 643 F.2d, 1043, n. 16.
24has jurisdiction over Dr. Kevorkian. Since the Mercitron and CO mask were
both distributed to patients lled with drugs, they would arguably have to be
regulated as combination products rather than as simple medical devices, po-
tentially depriving the FDA of the advantage of the broader authority granted
by 21 U.S.C. x334(a). Since all of the suicides were performed in Michigan,
where the machines were created and distributed, the machines themselves ar-
guably were not involved in interstate commerce. Therefore, FDA may have
to demonstrate that some of the machine's components were involved in in-
terstate commerce, a potentially dicult task. Far easier and just as eective
for its purposes, however, would be for the FDA to publish a policy statement
regarding PAS products, outlining the regulatory steps the agency would take
if any such item tried to enter the market. The statement would, of course,
have to recognize a de minimis exception of custom devices as provided in
x520(b) of the FD&C Act. However, notication of an intention to seize a new
PAS product and bring charges for failure to follow FD&C standards regarding
pre-market testing, notication and approval, proper labeling, and good manu-
facturing practices would instill the desired fear in any manufacturer thinking
of following in Dr. Kevorkian's footsteps. Thus, FDA might be able to solve a
potential problem before it ever resurfaces.
If the FDA adopts this general approach to the rise of PAS, the
agency may be able to continue to walk the ne line between looking away from
the actions of individual physicians and their patients in the course of medical
practice and the agency's overall goal of protecting the welfare of the American
25public. Time will tell, of course, whether organizations like the Hemlock Society
or individuals opposing the practice of PAS will force FDA's hand on this issue
and directly or indirectly compel FDA to take action regarding the increasing
use of drugs and medical devices in PAS. For the sake of those who may opt for
PAS, however, it is hoped that this does not come to pass and that the FDA
will be able to maintain a respectful coexistence with the practice of PAS for
many years to come.
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